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 Subjective integration of probabilistic information obtained via description 
and experience underlies potentially consequential judgments and choices. However, 
little is known about the quality of the integration and the underlying processes.  
I contribute to filling this gap by investigating judgments informed by 
integrating probabilistic information from the two sources. Building on existing 
information integration frameworks (e.g., N. Anderson, 1971), I develop and 
subsequently test computational models that represent the integration process.  
Participants in three experiments estimated the percentage of red balls in a bag 
containing red and blue balls based on two samples drawn from the bag. They 
experienced one sample by observing a sequence of draws and received a description 
of the other sample in terms of summary statistics. Subjective integration was more 
sensitive to information obtained via experience than via description in a manner that 
depended on the extremity of the experienced sample relative to the described one.  
 
 
Experiment 1 showed that experience preceding description leads to 
integration that is less biased towards experience than the reverse presentation 
sequence. Following this result, Experiment 2 examined the effect of memory-
retrieval demands on the quality of the integration. Specifically, we manipulated the 
presence or absence of description- and experience- based decision aids that eliminate 
the need to retrieve source-specific information. The results show that the experience 
aid increased the bias, while the description aid had no interpretable effect. 
Experiment 3 investigated the effect of the numerical format of the description 
(percentage vs. frequency). When description was provided in the frequency format,
the judgments were unbiased and the leading model suggested that the two sources 
are psychologically equivalent. However, when the description was provided in the 
percentage format, the leading model implied a tradeoff between the two sources. 
Finally, participants in Experiment 3 also rated how much they trusted the 
source of the description. The participants’ ratings were correlated with how they 
used the description and with the quality of their judgments.  
The findings have implications for interpreting the description-experience gap 
in risky choice, for information integration models, and for understanding the role of 
format on the use of information from external sources. In addition, the methods 
developed here can be applied broadly to study how people integrate information 
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
 
Human judgment and decision making can be guided by two distinct sources 
of information, personal experience or description. Experience refers to observing 
information directly whereas description refers to information that has been observed 
and abstracted by a source other than the judge/decision maker. To exemplify the 
distinction, consider the information guiding physicians: they obtain experience from 
exposure to patients whereas they obtain description by reading professional 
literature.  
Intuition suggests that humans guide their judgments and decisions by 
integrating description and experience (e.g., physicians integrate the two types of 
information to choose a treatment plan). Although such integration informs 
potentially consequential decisions, we know very little about its quality and the 
psychological processes that underlie it. The purpose of the current research was to 
assess the quality of judgments informed by integrating probabilistic informati n 
obtained from description and experience and to elucidate the integration process.  
The research focus relates to the description-experience gap (Barron, Leider & Stack, 
2008; Hertwig, Barron, Erev & Weber, 2004). The theoretical background relates to 
information integration in other contexts including subjective averaging (N. 
Anderson, 1968; Levin, 1975), belief updating (Wallsten, 1972) and using advice 
(Yaniv & Kleinberg, 2000).  
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The current investigation has theoretical, empirical, and practical significa ce.   
The theoretical significance is the use of a normative integration model to devel p a 
family of computational models of subjective integration. The empirical significa ce 
consists of identifying factors that affect the quality of the integration and the 
model(s) that mimic the integration principles. The model development, data 
collection methodology, and empirical findings have practical significance: they can 
be adapted to address the quality of integration performed outside the lab and to 
inform efforts to improve the quality of such integration.  
The paper is organized in the following way. After reviewing research 
pertinent to integrating description and experience, I develop a hierarchy of models of 
subjective information integration. The empirical component of the research 
consisting of three experiments, is reported next, each experiment in a separate 
chapter. Finally, the general discussion summarizes the findings, provides an 
interpretation and discusses their implications for related research on how information 
from description and experience is processed and integrated. 
 
 
Previous Research on Integrating Description and Experience 
The task of combining information obtained via description and experience 
can be construed in the following way. The task requires integrating two units of 
information, p1 and p2, one from description and the other from experience. This 
construal leads to three questions about subjective integration of description and 
experience: (1) What is the quality of subjective integration, given some normative 
standard? (2) Does the integration depend on how the information is distributed 
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between the two sources (e.g., p1 from description and p2 from experience)? (3) What 
are the processes that underlie subjective integration? 
There is no research to answer Question 2, and only two studies that provide 
preliminary answers to Questions 1 and 3. In one study, Newell & Rakow (2007) 
provided people with a description, and then tested whether they were affected by 
experience  containing the same information. Specifically, they provided partici nts 
a description of a die with four black faces and two white faces and then asked 
participants to predict the outcome of rolling the die (i.e., whether it would land on a 
black or a white face). Participants were told that the die was fair and unbiased. The 
crucial manipulation was whether or not participants observed the outcome after each 
prediction; i.e., whether or not they received experience.  
Newell and Rakow (2007) found that participants who observed the outcomes 
made correct predictions (i.e., they predicted the black face of the die) more often 
than those who did not observe the outcomes. Clearly, participants relied on 
experienced information to revise their predictions.  
In the second pertinent study, Barron, Leider, and Stack (2008; Experiments 
1, 2, and 3) investigated whether subjective integration is sensitive to the timing of 
obtaining the information. Participants in their study made 100 risky choices between 
two outcome distributions, and received outcome information (experience) that was 
contingent on each choice. In addition to experiencing the outcome distributions, 
participants read a warning about a large but unlikely loss associated with one of the 
distributions (i.e., participants received a description). Crucially, one group of 
participants received description before making the first choice, and a second group 
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received it after making the 50th. Although the two groups had the same information 
after the 50th trial (i.e., choice), their choices in trials 51-100 were not comparable.   
Barron and colleagues (2007; Experiment 4) eliminated the timing effect by 
modifying the aforementioned operational definition of experience. In Experiments 1, 
2, and 3, participants made 100 choices between two outcome distributions. In 
contrast, in the first 50 trials of Experiment 4 participants merely observed a s quence 
of monetary gains sampled from each of the two distributions. One participant group 
obtained description (i.e., the warning) followed by experience; a second participant 
group obtained the information in the reverse sequence.  Then, in trials 51-100, after 
they had obtained information from both sources, participants made a set of 
consequential choices. There was no evidence that choices were affected by the 
presentation sequence (timing) of information from the two sources.  
Barron and colleagues (2007) and Newell and Rakow (2007) are mute 
regarding the relationship (if any) between the subjective processes that oper e on 
the two sources, and how that relationship contributes to the observed behavior. 
Absent these assumptions, our answer to Question 3 (process) is very limited. 
Participants in both investigations were presented with only one pattern of 
assignment of the information units to the two sources. Thus, the data from these two 
reports cannot be used to answer Question 2, which concerns how integration 
depends on the distribution of information between the two sources. We do not know 
whether the observed behavior should be attributed to processing description versus 
experience, or to processing particular values of p1 and p2. Without controlling for 
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these possibilities, we cannot assess the quality of the integration and answer 
Question 1.   
 
A Theoretical Framework of Subjective Information Integration   
  
The experimental paradigms employed to test how people integrate 
description and experience [i.e., the paradigms used by Barron and colleagues (2007) 
and by Newell and Rakow (2007)] are similar in important ways to those employed to 
test people’s performance in other integration tasks (e.g., Bayesian inference, 
Wallsten, 1972; risky choice, Anderson & Shanteau, 1970; person perception, Fiske, 
1980; perceptual judgments; Mellers & Birnbaum, 1982). All of these paradigms 
consist of providing participants with some information and subsequently testing 
whether and how participants use that information to perform the task specified by 
the experimenter.   
Performance in the various integration tasks probably relies on a shared set of 
processes.  Assuming a common process, we can rely on existing frameworks of 
integration (e.g., Goldstein & Einhorn, 1987; Massaro & Friedman, 1990; Mellers & 
Birnbaum, 1982; N. Anderson, 1971; Wallsten, 1972) to theorize about the processes 
that underlie the integration of description and experience.   
Many information integration frameworks relate the observed behavior to 
experimental stimuli by assuming three underlying processes: scaling, integration and 
response (e.g., Goldstein & Einhorn, 1987; Massaro & Friedman, 1990; Mellers & 
Birnbaum, 1982; N. Anderson, 1971). The observed behavior can be expressed as a 
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composition of three functions corresponding to the three processing assumptions 
(Mellers & Birnbaum, 1982).  
Figure 1 provides a visual representation of integration models that follow this 
scheme. Scaling transforms a physical stimulus P into a subjective stimulus p 
(Mellers & Birnbaum, 1982) by the psychophysical function, Φ , i.e., )(Pp Φ= . 
Integration refers to the process that actually combines the subjective stimuli (e.g., 
Massaro & Friedman, 1990). Limiting the exposition to the integration of two stimuli, 
the aggregation assumption is expressed as function Ω that takes stimuli ip and jp  as 
input and yields a new datum, jir , , as output. [i.e., )( ,, jiji ppr Ω= ]. The response 
assumption specifies the transformation of the subjectively integrated informati n to 
overt and therefore measurable behavior. Specifically, the transformation 
function,Ψ , translates the new datum to an observed response, )(ˆ ,, jiji rR Ψ= .  
 





We rely on this approach to develop a set of models for the current integration 
task. The intuition for the models follows the formal development.  For ease of 
presentation, we specify the response, aggregation and scaling assumptions in this 
order.  
Response. The response function formalizes assumptions about the 
transformation of covert information into an overt (measurable) response (e.g., Erev, 
Wallsten, & Budescu, 1994). Here, we assume that the observed response is identical 
to the covertly integrated stimulus (for a similar approach, see Anderson & Shanteau, 
1970). Formally,  
jiji rR ,, = .     (1) 
Aggregation. The current integration task involves estimating a population 
mean based on two sample outcomes. In all that follows, we assume independent 
samples of equal size n. Thus, the normatively prescribed integration procedure for 
this task is to average the two sample means.  
Our assumption about the subjective integrator generalizes the prescribed 























samples equally. The other is that the subjective integration mechanism operates on 
subjectively scaled inputs, i.e., inputs that differ in systematic ways from those used 
by the normative rule.  
We refer to the subjectively scaled inputs from description and experience as 
Dp and Ep , respectively. The corresponding integration weights are Dw  and Ew . 








=Ω== )(ˆ ,, .   (2) 
To facilitate subsequent development we assume that the weights are normalized 
(i.e., 1=+ ED ww ) and rewrite the integration assumption,  
 EEDDEDED pwpwpprR +=Ω== )(ˆ ,, .                         (2a) 
Scaling. The final, but crucial component of our subjective integration model 
is the scaling assumption,   
( ) )1(505050)( iiiiiiii PPPp κκκ −+=+−=Φ= .  (3)   
The value of κ governs the relationship between the actual and the subjective sample 
percentages. We subscript κ o allow the two sources to be modeled by distinct 
parameter values (i.e., yielding a source-dependent scaling of the objective stimulus). 
The restrictions on κ (e.g., κ>0) and the justification of these restrictions are detailed 
more meaningfully below.  
Unlike a standard linear model with a separate parameter for the intercept and the 
slope, here the intercept and slope are governed by the single parameter, κ . This
structure is required to maintain the assumption that the transformations are 
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symmetric about %50=P (for related claims, see Anderson & Shanteau, 1970; 
Rosenbaum & Levin, 1968). The objective and subjective sample percentages are 
identical when 1=iκ .  The subjective percentage is less extreme (i.e., closer to 50%) 
than the objective percentage when 1<iκ ; the converse is true if 1>iκ . 
The synthesis of the aforementioned assumptions yields a formal 
representation of the function that relates the human’s overt integration behavior to 
the information presented to her. We derive this representation by composing the 
functions (Mellers & Birnbaum, 1982) associated with the encoding, integration, and 
response assumptions to yield the following expression,  
=+=Ω== EEDDEDED pwpwpprR )(ˆ ,,    (4) 
)]1(50[)]1(50[ EEEEDDDD PwPw κκκκ −++−+ .   
 
The model with 4 parameters, ωD, ωE, κD, κE, is not identifiable.  To see this, we 
rearrange the algebra, 
( ) ( ) 505050ˆ +−+−= EEEDDD ppR κωκω .           (4a) 
 
Thus, the model has two estimable parameters, DDD κωα = and EEE κωα = ,   
( ) ( ) 505050ˆ +−+−= EEDD PPR αα     (5) 
    )](1[50 EDEEDD PP αααα +−++= . 
The algebraic rearrangement in Equation 5 highlights the fact that it is impossible to 




The primary vehicle for interpreting the data in the subsequent experiments is 
the model specified in Equation 5 (i.e., Equation 5 is the full model). Technical 
details about fitting the model to the data, including the model’s error theory, are 
provided in the results section of Experiment 1.   
 
Model interpretation. The full model does not incorporate any assumption 
about the expected relationship between αD and αE. One possibility is that the two 
values are statistically independent of each other. An intuitive interpretation is that 
the processes that scale the two sources are unrelated to each other. Other possibilities 
include specific relations between αD and αE . 
We consider three alternative assumptions about the relationship between the 
two coefficients. Each assumption corresponds to a specific hypothesis about the 
subjective integration processes. In turn, each hypothesis implies a unique constraint 
on the parameter space of the full model (i.e., the values of Dα  and Eα  in Equation 
5). The hypotheses, the corresponding model constraints, and the predicted judgments 
are summarized in Table 1.  
The tradeoff model is related to the integration assumption. The model 
coefficients correspond to the weights that the integrator attaches to the scaled stimuli 
(e.g., N. Anderson, 1971). The hypothesis is that the scaled stimuli compete for the 
integrator’s limited processing resources (attention; e.g., Goldstein & Ehorn, 1987). 
Thus, the weights correspond to stimulus characteristics such as the fluency of 
parsing stimuli in different formats (Johnson, Payne, & Bettman, 1988); retrieving 
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them from memory (Weiss & N. Anderson, 1969); their credibility/diagnostic value 
(Yaniv, Kleinberger, 2000); and concreteness (Hamilton & Thompson, 2007).  
The second and third models reflect the hypothesis that the integrator is 
equally sensitive to inputs from the two sources. Equivalently, both models are 
motivated by the idea that information processing is source-invariant. The difference 
between the two models is in whether they assume optimal weighting of the inputs. 
The assumption expressed in the equal-non-normative model is that the scaling of the 
objective stimuli is independent of its source. The equal-normative model requires the 
subjective stimuli to be identical to their objective counterparts.   
 
Table 1. Hypotheses and corresponding constraints and predictions of the integration 
models.  
 Model 
Hypothesis    Constraint Prediction 
Full  None )](1[50ˆ EDEEDD PPR αααα +−++=  
Tradeoff   1=+ ED αα   
Equal – non-normative   5.≠= ED αα  )21(50)(ˆ DEDD PPR αα −++=  
Equal - normative    5.== ED αα   
 
Information distribution. Are judgments based on description and experience 
affected by the distribution of the information? Specifically, let T and T′ refer to two 
distributions of information between the two sources. In T, description provides 
information about P1 (and experience provides information about P2), and in 
EDDD PPR )1(ˆ αα −+=
)(5.ˆ ED PPR +=
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distribution T′, the assignment is reversed. Will judgments based on distributions T 
and T′ be related to each other in a systematic way?  
As mentioned earlier, the normative principle that is applicable for the current 
research is to average the information in P1 and P2. Furthermore, averaging obeys 
commutativity. Let R*, RT, and RT′ correspond to the normative judgment and the 
judgment based on distributions T and T′, respectively. We 
obtain, )(5.)(5. 1221
* PPPPRRR BA +=+=== . Thus, from a normative 
perspective, judgments based on distributions T and T′ should be identical to each 
other.  
Previous research on subjective integration suggests that normative principles 
cannot account for subjective integration (e.g., Anderson & Shanteau, 1970). 
However, there are no hints regarding the effect of information distribution.  
One possibility is that the information distribution has no effect. As shown in 
Appendix A, this requires the assumption that the two sources are treated equally 
(i.e., ED αα = ). Note that this is precisely the prediction of the equal-non-normative 
model. 
Alternatively, the information distribution will produce deviations from the 
prescribed judgment that are equal in magnitude but opposite in sign (i.e., the 
deviations are symmetric with respect to the prescribed response). Again, as shown in 
Appendix A, this requires a tradeoff between processing the two sources, 
(i.e., 1=+ ED αα ). This is precisely the prediction of the tradeoff model.  
The final possibility is that the deviations given the two information 
assignments are not equal to each other. Continuing the previous developments, this 
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implies that ED αα ≠  and 1≠+ ED αα . Note that within our model hierarchy, only 
the full model is consistent with this hypothesis.  
 
 Questions of Interest, Predictions, and Hypotheses  
  
 
The research poses three interrelated questions about the subjective integratio  of 
information from description and experience. 1) Does a normative model of 
integration provide a reasonable approximation of subjective integration? 2) If not, 
does the integration depend on information assignment? (3) How does the integration 
occur?    
As in previous research on description and experience (Barron et al., 2008; Hau, 
Pleskac, Kiefer, & Hertwig, 2008), we operationally define the two modes as 
different methods of obtaining information about a population of outcomes. 
Experience refers to information obtained from sampling individual outcomes from 
the population. Description refers to information obtained from a numerical summary 
of a sample (i.e., 80% of the chips are red). 
We investigated subjective integration in a task that normatively requires 
averaging information from two samples to yield an estimate of the corrsponding 
population average. The two samples provided information about the composition of 
a bag of red and blue chips (c.f., Phillips & Edwards, 1966; Pitz, Dowling, & 
Reinhold, 1967). In any one trial, participants experienced a sample by observing a 
sequence of sampled chips and received a description of another sample in the form 
of a summary its composition. After receiving the information in both samples, 
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participants estimated the percentage of red chips in the bag (i.e., the population 
parameter). Participants were told that the description was reliable, and received 
information indicating that the two samples associated with each bag consisted of th  
same number of chips.  
The task was designed such that each pair of samples from a particular bag 
appeared in two experimental conditions over the course of a session. In one 
condition, sample A was experienced and sample B was described and in the second 
condition, sample A was described and sample B was experienced. 
This judgment task was implemented in three experiments. Experiments 1 and 2 
manipulated the presentation order of the two sources, while Experiment 3 
manipulated the format of the description.    
Normatively, integration is unaffected by format, by presentation sequence, or by 
how information is distributed to the two sources (the sample assignment). This view 
implies that participants recognize the formal structure of the task and use the 
prescribed averaging rule to integrate the information (c.f., the script in Hertwig & 
Hortmann, 2001). Stated differently, the normative viewpoint predicts that the source 
of the information (and other features associated with it; e.g., presentation sequenc ) 
will not affect subjective integration.  
A large body of empirical evidence yields the opposite expectation. Human 
judges are affected by the context (i.e., source, format, presentation sequence) 
associated with the information. The expectation is supported by research on tasks 
that examine information integration in belief updating (Philips & Edwards, 1966), 
impression formation (N. Anderson, 1967), and perceptual judgments (Mellers & 
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Birnbaum, 1982). Additional evidence related to the distinction between description 
and experience (e.g., using advice, Yaniv & Kleinberg, 2000; frequency versus 
probability formats; Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995; product preference given exposure 
to trial versus ads; Hamilton & Thompson, 2007) motivates a more specific 
expectation that experience will be more prominent than description in the integrated 
output.  
 We interpret how participants produced their judgments (i.e., their estimates of 
the percentage of red chips) by fitting a hierarchy of integration models, as shown in 
Table 1, to the participants’ judgments. The fit of any given model yields estimates of 
the weights allotted to each information source. Comparing levels of fit across models 
allows us to identify the most likely description (among those considered) of the 





Chapter 2: Experiment 1 
 
The purpose of the experiment was to assess the quality of the integration of 
probabilistic information obtained from description and from experience. The 
experiment was designed to assess whether the integrator’s use of the information 
depended on the source that provided it, and whether the integration was sensitive to 
the presentation order of the two sources.  
 
Method  
Participants. One hundred sixty-two University of Maryland, College Park 
undergraduate students participated for course credit. In addition, they received a 
reward contingent on the accuracy of their judgment (see below).  
Stimuli. Two sets of bags were used in the experiment. Bags in the “identical-
percentage” set were associated with pairs of samples that contained an id ntical 
percentage of red chips. Bags in the “different-percentage” set were associated with 
pairs of samples that differed in the percentage of red chips. The two samples were 
either categorically congruent (i.e., both PD > 50% and PE >50% or both PD < 50% 
and PE < 50%) or categorically incongruent (i.e., one of PD and PE less than 50% and 
one greater than 50%). There were 10 and 18 bags in the identical- and different- 
percentage sets, respectively. All of the identical-percentage bags and 14 different-
percentage bags were used in the main experiment. The remaining four different- 
percentage bags were used for practice.  The sample size (i.e., the number of chips in 
the samples) ranged over trials from 8 to 13 and was always the same for a pair of 
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samples in a given trial. The sample and population percentages of red chips ranged 
from 14% to 86% (see Appendix B). 
Procedure. Participants were presented with instruction screens, followed by 
one trial with each of the practice bags. Participants typed their response, a d were 
then prompted to ask the experimenter for clarifications about the task. The responses 
obtained on the practice trials were excluded from the data analyses. After this, 
participants completed two trials with each of the experimental bags for a total of 52 
trials (i.e., 4+2x24).  
The practice trials and experimental trials were identical in design. 
Participants initiated each trial by clicking a button. Each trial consisted of three 
parts. One, participants clicked a button to draw one chip from one sample, and 
continued clicking the button until they had viewed each of the chips in that sample. 
The chip appeared on the display 500ms after each click, and remained visible until 
the next button click. Two, participants clicked a button to receive the description of 
the second sample. The description consisted of a picture of “Mr. Rick” (i.e., the 
source of the description), the number of chips that he sampled, and the percentage of 
red chips he observed. This information remained visible until the participant’s next 
click. Three, participants typed their estimate of the percentage of red chips in the 
bag. The experiment was programmed so that only integers in the [1, 99] interval 
were accepted.  
Participants were randomly allocated to two experimental conditions. One group 
of participants (n = 82) obtained information from experience and then from 
description (i.e., Experience-1st). A second group (n = 80) obtained information on 
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each trial from description and then experience (i.e., Experience-2nd). Two bag 
presentation sequences were counterbalanced across participants. The sequence  were 
arranged so that the first and second presentation of each bag occurred in the first and
second block of 24 consecutive experimental trials, respectively. The presentation of 
bags in the identical- and different-percentage sets was intermixed within each block.  
The two blocks differed from each other in the information assignment of each of 
the different-percentage bags. In one block, the extreme sample associated with ach 
bag was experienced and the moderate sample associated with each bag was 
described (e.g., %80=EP  and %60=DP ).  In the second block, this assignment was 
reversed. The order of the two blocks was counterbalanced across participants.  
The computer scored the accuracy of the participant’s response on each trial using 
the following rule, ])(1[100 2*RRs −−= , where R  and *R  correspond to the observed 
and the prescribed response, respectively. At the end of the participant’s session, the 
computer computed the participant’s average score from the scores associated with 
the 48 experimental trials. The average score is bounded in [0, 100]; the value of 
s determined the probability that the participant earned a reward (i.e., a commuter’s 
mug). Since participants did not receive any feedback in the course of the experiment, 
the reward could not affect the data analyses and is not considered further.   
Results  
Figure 2 provides some orientation to the analyses. The two panels plot the 
across-participant average response as a function of the prescribed response 
associated with each bag. The left and right panels correspond to responses obtained 
in the Experience-1st and Experience-2nd conditions, respectively. Within each panel, 
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the filled squares correspond to trials in which the experienced sample contained a 
more extreme percentage than the described one contained, the empty diamonds 
correspond to trials with the reverse assignment (i.e., the experienced samplew s less 
extreme than the describe one), and the asterisks correspond to trials in which the 
experienced and described samples contained identical percentages.   
The data in Figure 2 suggest that there was less bias when experience was first 
rather than second. Furthermore, when experience and description were identical, 
judgments were too moderate. Finally, there is also some indication of the effect of 
the information assignment. The responses were too extreme when the experienced 
sample was more extreme than the described one. Conversely, the responses were too 
moderate when the experienced sample was more moderate than the described one.  
 
 
Experience 1st Experience 2nd 
Figure 2. Observed judgments as a function of the prescribed judgments in 
Experiment 1. Filled squares – experience more extreme than description; empty 





The analyses evaluate the quality of the observed judgments by testing for a 
systematic bias relative to the prescribed judgments. Thus, the analyses rely on the 
difference (δ) between observed judgment, R, relative to the prescribed 
judgment,
*R . Two bias measures based on δ are used. One, the signed bias, defined 
as *RR −=δ  if 50* >R , and RR −= *δ  if 50* <R .  Two, the unsigned 
(absolute) bias, || *RR −=δ .   
Both bias scores measure the location of the observed judgments relative to the 
diagonal. The signed bias indicates whether the responses tend to be too moderate or 
too extreme, whereas the unsigned bias indexes the consistency of the integration.   
The data from one participant in the Experience-1st and two participants in the 
Experience-2nd conditions were excluded from all analyses because their signed bias 
scores were lower than -18.  These scores deviated from the mean of the entire 
sample by more than 4.5 standard deviation units (the next highest score was -12.2).  
Signed deviations. Judgments, averaged for each participant across all of the 
trials, were too moderate (M = -1.48, SEM = .20); the bias was reliable t(158) = 7.49, 
p < .001. The conservative response pattern converges with that obtained by most 
research on Bayesian updating (e.g., Philips & Edwards, 1966).   
We turn to the question of whether the bias was contingent on the sample 
assignment and the presentation sequence. By design, the normative judgments 
associated with the different-percentage bags were less extreme than those of t e 
identical-percentage bags. The reliability of the findings is assessed in parate 
analyses for each set of bags to avoid a potential confound of this factor.   
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In the same-percentage trials there was a reliable effect of the presentation 
sequence, t(157) = 2.78, p < .01. The Experience-1st sequence (M = -1.91) was 
associated with less bias than the Experience-2nd sequence (M = -3.79).  
Turning to different-percentage trials, the data in Figure 3 show that the direction 
of the bias followed the extremity of the experienced sample. That is, response 
tended to be too extreme when the experienced sample was more extreme than the 
described one and too moderate in the reverse case. The bias is attenuated in the 
Experience-1st condition relative to the Experience-2nd condition.  
 
Figure 3. Signed bias. Extreme and moderate experience refer to the information assignment 
on each trial (e.g., experienced sample more extreme than described sample).  
 
The information assignment, source sequence, and assignment by sequence 
interaction yielded significant effects, F(1, 157) = 44.55, p < .001, F(1, 157) = 6.33, p 
< .05, and F(1, 157) = 4.35, p < .05, respectively. The effect of information 
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assignment was reliable in both the Experience-1st and the Experience-2nd sequences, 
t(80) = 3.23, p < .005, and t(77) = 6.22, p < .001, respectively. The effect of the 
presentation sequence was reliable when experience was moderate, t(157) = 2.96, p < 
.005, but not when it was extreme, t < 1. 
 
Absolute deviations. The analysis of the signed deviations showed that the 
judgments were biased in the direction of the experienced outcome. We turn to testing 
whether the consistency of the integration depended on whether experience was first 
or second and whether the extreme (vs. moderate) outcome was experienced or 
described. Only different-percentage trials are included in this analysis.  
The presentation sequence by information assignment did not achieve 
significance, F(1,157) = 3.43, p = .07. Consistency was greater when experience was 
first (M = 9.12, SEM = .50) rather than second (M = 10.21, SEM = .51), and this effect 
was significant, F(1, 157) = 11.73, p < .001.   
The bias scores, given that the extreme outcome was experienced versus 
described were (M = 8.83, 95% CI  = 8.06-9.61, Median = 7.93) and (M = 9.09, 95% 
CI  = 8.32-9.86, Median = 8.79), respectively. Noting the skew in the distribution of 
bias scores given an extreme experience, I performed both parametric and 
nonparametric analyses. The effect of assignment was not significant when ested 
with either a standard ANOVA, F(1, 157) = 1.14, p > .2,  or by a sign test, p = .81. 
Bracketing violations. The normative judgment lies in the interval bracketed by 
the described and experienced samples. However, we did not implement any 
procedure that would constrain the participants’ judgments to lie within this bracket. 
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The participant’s judgment violates the bracket whenever it falls outside the interval 
bounded by PD and PE (c.f., Soll & Larrick, 2009). We assess the occurrences of 
bracketing violations, because as we see in the next section, these violations must be
considered in applying the subjective integration models.  
The analysis of the bracketing violations is based on judgments associated with 
the different-proportion trials. The mean, median and modal number of bracket 
violations per participant was 5.8, 5.0, and 1.0 (out of 28 trials), respectively. The 
minimum and maximum number of violations (per participant) were 0 (n = 18) and 
21 (n = 1).   
 
Modeling Subjective Integration of Description and Experience  
 
The purpose of fitting the integration models (Equation 5 and Table 2) to the 
observed judgments is twofold. One, the fits yield maximum likelihood parameter 
estimates for each participant that allow interpretation of the observed judgments in 
terms of the participant’s sensitivity to information provided by the two sources (i.e., 
corresponding to the values ofDα  and Eα ). Two, the model comparisons allow tests 
of hypotheses about the integration process (more precisely, the relationship between 
the two α s).  
 
Maximum likelihood estimation procedure  
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This section details the application of the maximum likelihood procedure to 
the full model (Equation 5). The modifications of this procedure for the nested 
models are detailed at the end of the section.   
The full model yields an expression for the predicted judgment, R̂ , in terms 
of the information from the two sources and the associated weights. Allowing for 
trial-by-trial variability, ε, the observed judgment1, R, can be expressed as ε+= RR ˆ . 
We assume a normal distribution of ε s with mean θ and standard deviationς .   
The four parameters of the full model (i.e., ),,, ζθαα ED were selected 
separately for each participant to maximize the log likelihood of the distribution of 
RR ˆ−=ε  for that participant. The expression for the log likelihood of ε  given the 
model predicted judgment is,  







tfL ε ,    (6) 
where )( tf ε refers to the likelihood of the residualε  under N(θ, ζ) associated with the 
participant’s response on trial t. To reiterate, this procedure identifies four parameters 
that maximize the value of L in Equation 6.   
 The selection of the four parameters was subject to the following constraints. 
The starting values ofDα , Eα ,θ , and ζ were .5, .5, 0, and 12, respectively. The 
starting value for ζ  was informed by some pilot runs with the model. The 
permissible range of values of θ and ζ was  90|| <θ  and 4001. << ζ . 
                                                
1 All of the integration models yield a prediction for each participant on each trial. The use of 
subscripts for the participant, trial, and model is m nimized for ease of presentation.  
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The permissible range of values of Dα and Eα was guided by a methodological 
and an empirical consideration. By design, participants were required to make 
judgments in the [1, 99] interval. This implies that the model should not be permitted 
to make predictions outside this interval. Empirically, we observed bracketing 
violations. These violations can be interpreted as a subjective stretching or shrinking 
of the response scale. I constrained theα s to the [-1, 1] interval. This range is 
necessary to allow the model to predict the bracketing violations. At the same time, 
this range also allows the model to predict judgments outside the [1, 99] interval.   
The only difference between this procedure and the procedures for the nested 
models was the constraint that was imposed on the model parameters (e.g., in the 
procedure for the tradeoff model, )1 DE αα −= . Values of θ  and ζ were selected 
separately for each participant and each model.  
 
Maximum likelihood parameter estimates  
The maximum-likelihood parameter estimates of 
Dα  and Eα  from the full model, 
as well as DE ααα −=∆ , are summarized in Table 2. The summary for each 
parameter and their difference includes the across-participant mean and the 95% 
confidence interval.  
Note that αE is consistently greater than .50 and αD is consistently less than .50, 
suggesting that the experienced sample is accorded an excessively extreme subjective 
value and the described value is accorded an excessively moderate subjective value. 




Table 2. Description and Experience Coefficients (Experiment 1).   
 
Dα   Eα   α∆  
Presentation sequence M CI   M CI  M CI 
Experience-1st (n = 81) .40 .36-.45  .56 .51-.61  .16  .06-.25 
Experience-2nd (n = 78) .29 .24-.34  .58 .54-.63  .29 .20-.38 
Note.  CI refers to the 95% confidence interval.Dα and Eα correspond to the 
sensitivity to description and experience, respectively. DE ααα −=∆ .  
 
The difference between the two coefficients, DE ααα −=∆ , provides a more 
concise indication of the differences in processing experienced versus described 
probabilistic information. The mean values are positive and the confidence intervals 
do not bracket zero, indicating that the sensitivity to experience was reliably larger
than that of description (see Table 2).  
A multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) with the two coefficients as the 
dependent variables and the presentation sequence as its factor yielded a significnt 
effect, F(2, 156) = 6.76, p < .005. Univariate analyses yielded a reliable effect on 
Dα , 
F(1, 157) = 9.44, p < .005, but not on 
Eα , F < 1. 
 The across-participant distribution of the coefficients provides some evidence 
that the processes that operate on the two sources were related to each other. 
Specifically, the Pearson correlation (r) between 
Dα  and Eα  was -.69, p < .001. 
Thus, across participants, the sensitivity to description is inversely related to he 
sensitivity to experience. 
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As noted earlier, the two α s were estimated subject to the restriction that they 
ranged in the [-1, 1] interval. This restriction reduces, but does not eliminate the 
chances that the model would yield predictions outside the [1, 99] interval.  
The effectiveness of the restriction was assessed by computing the actual range of 
the model predictions for each participant. The restriction was effective, as indicated 
by the finding that the range of the model predictions for all of the participants ws 
below 1002. However, for one participant, 1=Dα , and for seven subjects, 1=Eα ; 
there were no other cases in which the coefficients were on the boundaries of the 
permissible range (i.e., [-1, 1]).  
We present the correspondence between the model-predicted judgments and the 
observed judgments in Figure 4. Each point is a model prediction for a given pair of 
samples in a particular assignment to description and experience. The predicted 
values are based on the coefficients in Table 2 (i.e., the across-participant mean 
values). Overall, the correspondence between observed and predicted judgments 
appears adequate, with the exception of more scatter in the Experience-2nd sequence.   
Analyses of the error parameters of the full model yielded an unexpected patt rn.  
The residuals (i.e., theε s associated with the model predictions), averaged over 
participants, were biased, 70.=θ (SEM = .22). This bias was reliably different from 
zero, t(158) = 3.15, p = .002. The bias in the two presentation sequences was 
comparable, t < 1.  Second, the scatter of the residuals (i.e.,ς ) in the Experience-1st  
condition (Median = 6.40) was lower than in the Experience-2nd condition (Median = 
9.07). The difference was reliable, per a Mann-Whitney U test (p < .001).  
                                                






















Figure 4. Predicted judgments as a function of observed judgments in Experiment 1. Filled 
squares = experienced outcome more extreme than described outcome; empty squares = 
experienced outcome more moderate than described outcome.   
 
Model comparisons  
 
The tradeoff, equal-normative, and equal-non-normative models shown in Table 1 
are nested under the full model. Thus, the full model was compared to each of the 
nested models by computing the difference in log likelihood as follows, G2 = 2 (Lfull – 
Lm), with m indexing the nested model (e.g., the tradeoff model). The G
2 statistic is 
chi-square distributed with degrees of freedom equal to the difference in the number 
of parameters (Riefer & Batchelder, 1988). For example, the comparison of the full 
and the tradeoff models involves df = 4 – 3 = 1). We fit the models to the data of each 
participant separately and, in addition, summed the G2 values and degrees of freedom 
over participants to yield a single more powerful test at the group level. All model 




By-subject analysis. The results of the by-subject comparisons are summarized in 
Table 3. The values in each row correspond to the proportion of participants for 
whom the model on the given row was not significantly different from the full model 
(per the G2 test). Table 3 reveals that the tradeoff model is the only viable candidate 
for most participants. This finding is expected considering the inverse relationship 
between the coefficients estimated from the full model. Support for the tradeoff 
model was comparable across the two presentation sequences (a χ2 test performed on 
the proportions in the top row of Table 3 yielded p > .2).  
 
Table 3. Results of Nested Model Comparisons (Experiment 1)  
 Presentation sequence 
Model Experience -1st  Experience-2nd 
Tradeoff .80  .73 
Equal-non-normative .44  .40 
Equal-normative .43  .33 
Note. The value in each cell corresponds to the proportion of participants for whom the 
model in the given row provides a comparable fit to the full model per the G2 test. Thus, 
higher values indicate better fitting models. 
 
The G2 statistic is limited to comparisons between nested models and so cannot be 
used to compare the tradeoff and equal-non-normative models, which are not nested. 
An alternative way to compare these two models is to compute, for each participant, 
the log of the likelihood ratio, )/ln( ET=λ , where T and E correspond to the 
likelihoods of the data under the tradeoff and equal-non-normative models, 
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respectively (c.f., Glover & Dixon, 2004). Positive values of λ  lend support for the 
tradeoff model.    
For most participants, the tradeoff model was preferred to the equal non-
normative model. The values of λ were positive (λ  ≥ .03) for 73.3% of the 
participants and negative for the others (λ  ≤ -.01). The proportion of positive λ is 
reliably different from chance (i.e., equally probable positive and negativeλ ), p < 
.001, per a binomial test. The λ s in the two presentation sequences were comparable, 
(p > .62, per Mann-Whitney U test).  
In principle, the tradeoff model could fit better than the equal-non-normative 
because it is more flexible, not because it provides a better description. To testthis 
possibility, I used each participant’s parameter estimates under each model to 
generate new data under that model and then fit this generated data with each model. 
If one model is more flexible than the other, it should provide the better fit to data 
generated by both models. If neither model is more flexible than the other, each on 
should be superior at recovering its own data.  
The tradeoff model fits its data better than the equal-non-normative model for 
81% of the participants. The equal-non-normative model fits its data better than the 
tradeoff model for 67% of the participants. These patterns indicate that the superior fit 
of the tradeoff model relative to the equal non-normative is not due to differential 
flexibility.  
Group analyses. The results of the group-level analyses are consistent with 
those of the individual-participant analyses. The three restricted models were 
significantly worse than the full model. The dfs involved in comparing the tradeoff, 
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equal-non-normative, equal-normative models to the full model were 159, 159, and 
318, respectively. The G2 and p values associated with comparing the three models 
were 375.5, 2140.0, and 2429.0; for all comparisons, p < .001.  
The λ obtained from comparing the tradeoff model to the equal-non-normative 
model was 882.3, indicating that the tradeoff model was preferred to the equal-non-
normative model. A similar pattern of results was obtained when each presentation 




Experiment 1 assessed how decision makers integrate description- and 
experience- based probabilistic outcomes. The data showed that (1) overall, th  
judgments were too moderate; (2) the participants’ judgments were biased towar s 
the experienced over the described sample; (3) the judgments were affected by th  
sample assignment, particularly when experience followed description.    
The model coefficients and model comparisons suggest that the experienced 
outcomes were perceived or weighted as too extreme and described outcomes were 
perceived or weighted as too moderate. There was also a tradeoff relationship 
between processing the two sources.   
The model coefficients suggested further that the weight accorded the experienced 
sample was insensitive to whether it came first or second. However, the weight 
accorded the described sample showed a recency effect in that it was greater wh n the 
described sample was second than when it was first.  
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The absolute deviations and the scatter of the model predictions were sensitive to 
the presentation sequence, such that there was less bias and less scatter in the 
Experience-2nd sequence. The absolute deviations were comparable in both outcome 
assignments.  
The interpretation of the poorer integration in the Experience-2nd sequence is not 
clear. The model coefficients (i.e., α s) suggest the possibility of retrieval failures of 
the description when it appears first (i.e., in the Experience-2nd sequence). 
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Chapter 3: Experiment 2 
 
The findings of Experiment 1 indicated that participants were less sensitive to 
described than to experienced samples of information, particularly when the 
description was provided first. Pursuing the possibility that the effect is due to 
retrieval failure, Experiment 2 was conducted to clarify the role of memory retrieval 
in the integration task. The critical manipulation involved the information that was 
available during the response phase of each trial, framed in terms of the presence 
(versus absence) of description-based and experience-based memory aids. In aid-
absent conditions, information from one source was displayed and then removed 
before the display of the information from the second source. Conversely, in the aid-
present conditions, information was displayed and remained visible throughout the 
end of the trial.  
We orthogonally manipulated the experience- and description- aids in a 
factorial design to produce four conditions referred to as D-E-, -E+, D+E-, and D+E+. 
In this notation, the letter corresponds to the source (e.g., D representing description), 
and the + and – indicating the presence and absence of the aid, respectively. In the D-
E- conditions, information from one source was displayed and then removed, 
information from the second source was displayed and then removed, and then 
participants entered their responses (this cell of the design replicates the conditions of 
Experiment 1). In the D+E- and D-E+ conditions, the response was entered while the 
description (experience) was visible, eliminating the need to retrieve the description 
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(experience). Finally, both sources were visible while the response was entered i  th  
D+E+ condition; in this condition there was no need to retrieve either source.  
 
Method  
Participants. One hundred sixty undergraduate students participated in return for 
course credit.  
Stimuli. There were eight training and sixteen experimental bags. The bags 
differed from those of Experiment 1 in three ways. (1) The two samples associated 
with each bag always consisted of unequal but categorically similar proportions (i.e., 
both samples had the same majority color). (2) The samples always consisted of 13 
chips. (3) The sample and population percentages ranged from 0 to 100 and from 4% 
to 96%, respectively (see Appendix C).   
Design. Three variables were manipulated in a full factorial design: the source 
presentation sequence (as in Experiment 1), and the presence (vs. absence) of the 
description and the experience aids. Participants were randomly assigned to each of 
the 8 conditions (i.e., n = 20 in each condition). 
Participants received four trials with each experimental bag (as opposed to 
two in Experiment 1). As in Experiment 1, the presentations were blocked so that in 
each block the extreme and moderate samples were assigned to the description and 
experience formats, respectively, or in the opposite arrangement.  Half of the 
participants received descriptions and experiences of the extreme sample in blocks 1 
and 3 and in blocks 2 and 4, respectively. This arrangement was reversed for the other 




Procedure. The procedure started with a brief overview of the task. 
Participants were presented with instruction screens and then completed 72 trials.  For 
ease of exposition, details are provided for the procedure in the Experience-1st 
sequence. The Experience-2nd sequence is identical, except that experience follows 
description.  
Participants clicked a button to start drawing the chips in one sample (i.e., to 
obtain experience). Each chip was displayed for 1000 ms, and the inter-chip-interval 
was 2000 ms.  As the chip was removed, a circle was displayed in a rectangular 
region next to the picture of the bag. The color of the circle was determined by the
experience aid condition: in the E+ condition the color of a circle matched the color of 
the chip that was just drawn from the bag, and in the E- condition the circle was 
always gray. The circle remained visible throughout the end the trial. Thus, the 
number of circles in the rectangle corresponded to the number of chips observed in 
that trial.  
After obtaining experience, participants clicked a button to receive the 
description of the second sample. The description remained on the screen till the end
of the trial in the D+E- and D+E+ conditions, but was removed after 2500ms in the D-
E- and D-E+ conditions.  
Participants provided their estimates with a slider anchored “0% Red” on the 
left end, “50% Red” in the middle, and “100% Red” on the right end. Thus, unlike 
Experiment 1, participants were not restricted to the [1, 99] interval and they wer not 
required to type a numerical response.  
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The first eight trials served as familiarization trials; the responses obtained on 
these trials were excluded from the data analyses and will not be mentioned furth r. 
After the eighth trial, participants were prompted to ask the experimenter for 
clarifications about the task. The familiarization and experimental trialswere 
identical in design. 
 
Results  
 The judgments associated with the two replications (trials) of each bag and 
sample assignment were averaged prior to conducting the analyses. Thus, the 
analyses were based on 32 judgments per participant.  
The data from two participants in the D+E+  condition were excluded from all 
analyses because their signed bias scores were lower than -45.  These scores deviate 
from the mean of the entire sample by more than five standard deviations (the next 
highest score was -23.7).  
The signed bias across all conditions (M = -.19, SEM = .50) was not reliably 
different from zero, t < 1. However, the average judgment of 67% of the participants 
was too extreme; this percentage is reliably different from chance (p < .001, per 
binomial test).  
The signed bias scores are presented as a function of the information assignment, 
the source presentation sequence and the two aids in Figure 5. Visual inspection of 
the data indicates that as in Experiment 1, the direction of the bias is related to th  
experienced information (extreme vs. moderate). However, the effect of presentation 
sequence is less clear.  
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Figure 5. Signed bias in Experiment 2. The four panels correspond to the four levels obtained from the 
factorial manipulation of the description and experience aids. Rows correspond to levels of the 
experience aid; columns correspond to levels of the description aid.  Triangles – experienced 
information more extreme than the described one. Circles – experienced information less extreme than 
described one.   
 
The bias scores were submitted to ANOVA with assignment as the within-
participant factor and presentation sequence, experience aid, and description aid as 
the between-participant factors.  
The interaction yielded two reliable effects (p > .15 for all the other effects). 
Outcome assignment yielded a reliable effect, F(1, 150) = 59.63, p < .001. Judgments 
were too extreme when the experienced sample was extreme (M = 2.63, SEM = .7) 
and too moderate when the experience sample was moderate (M = -2.98, SEM = .55).  
The bias was qualified by the assignment by experience aid interaction, F(1, 150) 
= 4.2, p < .05. To facilitate exposition, the signed bias scores (i.e., Figure 5) are re-
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arranged and re-presented in Figure 6. The experience aid affected the judgm nts 
when the experienced information was more extreme than the described one, but not 
when the reverse was true, respectively, t(156) = 2.12, p < .05, and t(156) < 1.  The 
difference between the two information assignments was reliable when the aid was 
absent, t(79) = 3.71, p < .001, and when it was present, t(77) = 7.87, p = .001.   The 
bias (M = 1.19, SEM = .94) in the aid-absent extreme-experience condition was not 
significantly different from zero, t(79) = 1.27, p = .21. Conversely, the bias in the 
three other conditions was reliable (all ts>3.7).   
 
 




Absolute bias. The unsigned bias scores are presented as a function of the two 
aids, the source presentation sequence and the information assignment in Figure 7. 
The panels are arranged as in Figure 5.   









Figure 7. Absolute bias in Experiment 2. The four panels correspond to the four levels obtained from 
the factorial manipulation of the description and experience aids. Rows correspond to levels of the 
experience aid; columns correspond to levels of the description aid.  Triangles – experienced outcome 
more extreme than described one. Circles – experienced outcome less extreme than described one.   
 
  
The bias scores were submitted to ANOVA with information assignment as the 
within-participant factor and presentation sequence, experience aid, and description 
aid as the between-participant factors. The effect of information assignment was 
reliable, F(1, 150) = 46.26, p < .001. More bias was observed when the experienced 
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outcome was more extreme (M = 9.59, SEM = .38) relative to more moderate (M = 
7.65, SEM = .35). Inspection of the data at the individual-participant level reveals that 
this pattern was true for 73% of the participants; i.e., most participants had more bias 
when experience was extreme rather than moderate.  
The assignment by presentation sequence and assignment by presentation 
sequence by description aid interactions were marginally significant, F(1, 150) = 
3.13, p < .08 and F(1, 150) = 3.12, p < .08. The assignment by experience aid 
interaction was reliable, F(1, 150) = 5.96, p < .05.  Experience aid did not yield 
reliable effects regardless of whether experience was more extrem or ore moderate 
than description (p > .2, per paired-sample t-tests). The interpretation of these 
interactions is unclear.  
 
Bracketing violations. The mean, median and modal number of bracket violations 
per participant was 4.0, 3.0, and 2 (out of 32), respectively. The minimum and 
maximum number of violations (per participant) were 0 (n = 22) to 24 (n = 1).   
  
 Maximum likelihood parameter estimates  
The model derivation and analyses were conducted in the same manner as in 
Experiment 1. The description and experience coefficients (i.e., 
Dα  and Eα ) 
estimated from the full model indicated that participants were over-sensitiv  to 
experience and under-sensitive to description (see Table 4). The two coefficients were 




Table 4. Description and Experience Coefficients (Experiment 2).  
 
  
Dα   Eα   α∆  
Aid  M CI   M CI   M CI  
D-E-  .35 .29-.40  .58 .52-.64  .23 .14-.32 
D+E-  .42 .34-.50  .54 .45-.64  .12  -.04-.29 
D-E+  .35 .29-.41  .64 .56-.71  .29  .18-.39 
D+E+3  .34  .28-.40  .66  .58-.73  .31 .19-.43 
Note. CI refers to the 95% confidence interval. Dα  and Eα correspond to the estimated 
coefficients of description and experience. DE ααα −=∆ .  
 
The data in Table 4 suggest that Eα was affected by the experience aid.  A 
MANOVA with the two coefficients as the dependent variables and the presentation 
sequence and aids as its factors yielded no significant effect for these factors or their 
interactions (p > .1 for all tests). Univariate analyses yielded a reliable effect of the 
experience aid onEα , F(1,150) = 4.57, p < .05.   
 The restriction imposed on the model coefficients was more problematic relative 
to Experiment 1. Specifically, the model predicted responses outside the [0, 100] 
range for 24 (15%) participants. For 14 participants (9%), 1=Eα .   
Analyses of the error parameters of the full model yielded an unexpected patt rn.  
The residuals (i.e., theε s associated with the model predictions), averaged over 
participants, were biased, θ 15.1−= (SEM = .17). This bias was reliably different 
from zero, t(157) = 6.76, p < .001. There were no reliable differences as a function of 
                                                
3 The description- and experience- coefficients for the two participants excluded from this condition 
were negative. All other participants had at least one positive coefficient.  
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presentation sequence, description aid, or experience aid (p > .08, for each 
comparison).  Likewise, the scatter of the residuals (i.e.,ς , Median = 6.0) was 
unaffected by the presentation sequences or aids (p > .1, Mann-Whitney U test for 
each comparison).  
  
By-subject analysis: The full model is reliably better than the three restricted 
models in describing the data of most participants (see Table 3). The G2 comparisons 
between the fit of the full model and that of the tradeoff, equal-non-normative and 
equal-normative models were not significant for 41%, 40% and 19% of the 
participants. There were no reliable differences in the support for the full modeas a 
function of presentation sequence, description aid, and experience aid (i.e., the χ2 tests
on the proportions were not reliable, p > .31). 
The comparison between the tradeoff and equal-non-normative models showed 
that they were comparable. The values of λ were positive (≥.01) for 45.1% of the 
participants and negative for the others (< -.04). The proportion of λ s with positive 
and negative values were comparable (p > .1 per a binomial test). Presentation 
sequence, experience aid and description aid had no reliable effect on λ (p > .8 by 
Mann-Whitney U test).  
The test for differential model flexibility revealed that the tradeoff and equal non-
normative models recovered their own data for 84% and 78% of the participants, 
respectively.  These patterns indicate that the fits of the models to the observed data 




Group analysis: The dfs involved in comparing the tradeoff, equal-non-
normative, and equal-normative models to the full model were 158, 158, and 316. 
The G2 and p values associated with comparing the three models were 1898.2, 
2660.2, and 4166.0; for all comparisons, p < .001. Thus, the full model was 
significantly better than each of the three restricted models.  
The λ obtained from comparing the tradeoff model to the equal-non-normative 
model was 381.0, lending support for the tradeoff model over the equal-non-
normative model.   
 
 Discussion  
 Participants’ judgments were biased in the direction of their experience. Mor  
importantly, the magnitude of the bias depended on the information assignment. 
Judgments based on extreme experience and moderate description were more biased 
than those based on the reverse assignment. This finding shows that the quality of the 
integration judgment depends not only on the differential subjective sensitivity to the 
two sources, but also on the information that they convey.  
The effect of presentation sequence found in Experiment 1 was not replicated. 
The interaction of description aid, assignment, and presentation sequence on the 
absolute bias measure was marginally significant and its interpretation unclear. 
Experience aid yielded a reliable effect on Eα  and a reliable interaction with the 
information assignment as indexed by both bias measures.  
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Why was the effect of the presentation sequence in Experiment 1 not 
replicated? The designs of the two experiments differed from each other in a number 
of ways precluding a definite interpretation. However, a likely contributor to the 
findings is the use of a different response mode in each experiment. In Experiment 1 
participants typed their response while in Experiment 2 they adjusted a slider. The 
response format in Experiment 2 appears to be equally compatible with the format of 
the two information sources. In contrast, the response format in Experiment 1 appears 
to be more compatible with the format of described information relative to that of 
experienced information. Importantly, this compatibility is psychologically more 
salient in the Experience-1st condition (i.e., because the description immediately 
precedes the response) relative to the Experience-2nd condition (i.e., because the 
description does not immediately precede the response). 
The effect of the response format provides an alternative interpretation to the 
findings of Experiment 1 and a context for interpreting some findings of the current 
experiment. In Experiment 1, the sensitivity to description in the Experience-1st 
condition was superior to that in the Experience-2nd condition because of the temporal 
proximity to the compatible response format. According to the response-format 
account, there were no effects of presentation sequence in Experiment 2 because the 
response scale is equally compatible with both sources.  
The response-format and retrieval-failure accounts rival each other. The 
possibility that retrieval failures are not a factor in the integration task could explain 
why the description aid (which was designed to eliminate the retrieval failures) 
yielded no reliable effects.  
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Experience aid increased the signed bias when the experienced outcome was 
more extreme than the described one. Stated differently, given an extreme experi nce 
and moderate description, the presence of the experience aid shifts the judgments 
closer to the experienced outcome. Experience aid also had a reliable effect on Eα but 
no main effect per the signed bias measure. How could the experience aid affect the 
signed bias and model coefficients while not affecting the unsigned bias? The 
proffered interpretation is that the presence of the aid eliminates confusion involved 
in trial-by-trial counting of red chips. Having removed the effect of counting 







Chapter 4: Experiment 3 
 
Research on Bayesian inference shows that information presented in a 
percentage or probability format leads to judgments that are inconsistent with the 
Bayesian prescription (c.f., Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995). Other research on the use 
of advice shows that people perceive information from an external source as less 
reliable than their own (internal) information (e.g., Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000). In 
the first two experiments, description provided information from an external source in 
a percentage format.  Consistent with the previous findings, the judgments in the first 
two experiments were biased away from description.   
Experiment 3 served two purposes. One was to examine whether the bias 
observed in the first two experiments was the consequence of using the percentage 
format to convey the description. Thus, I tested whether the bias persists when the 
description is provided in a relative frequency format rather than a percentage format. 
The prediction from research on the role of format in Bayesian inference [e.g., 
Cosmides & Tooby (1996); Gigerenzer & Hoffrage (1995)] is that the frequency 
format would lead to superior integration than the percentage format. The second 
purpose was to relate the bias to the perceived trustworthiness of the source of the 
description.  
Method  
Participants, Stimuli, and Design. Fifty-eight undergraduate students 
participated in return for course credit. The bags in this experiment were the same as 
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those of Experiment 2. The presentation sequence was not manipulated; only the 
Experience-2nd sequence was used. Participants received two trials with each of the 
experimental bags (as in Experiment 1). The description format, percentage or 
frequency, was manipulated between-participants. Other details of the design w re 
similar to those of condition D-E- in Experiment 2. 
Procedure. The procedure was identical to that in the D-E- condition of 
Experiment 2, except for the following differences. (1) There were 32 experimental 
trials, consisting of two replications of each bag (in Experiment 2, there were four 
replications of each bag totaling 64 trials). (2) The gray circles and the surrounding 
rectangular region displayed in Experiment 2 were removed. (3) After completing the 
last trial, participants judged the following statement, “I trusted Mr. Rick to provide 
reliable information about the bag of chips.” Participants responded by marking a 5-
point scale labeled with “Completely disagree”, “Somewhat disagree”, “Nutral”, 





The analyses are based on 32 responses per participant. The presentation of 
the data is comparable to that used in Experiment 1 and 2. All of the participants had 
signed bias scores within 4SDs of the sample mean and were included in the analyses.  
Signed bias score. The judgments were moderate or regressive relative to the 
normative values, although the bias (M = -.55, SEM = .93) was not reliable (t < 1). As 
in the first two experiments, the direction of the bias was related to the experienced 
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outcome. However, Figure 8 shows that the contingency between the bias and the 
experienced outcome was pronounced when the description was presented in the 
percentage format but not in the frequency format.  The assignment by format 
interaction was significant, F(1,56) = 4.42, p < .05. Assignment produced a reliable 
effect, F(1, 56) = 9.47, p < .005, while the format did not, F(1, 56) = 1.65, p = .21. 
Assignment yielded a reliable effect when the description was formatted as a 
percentage, t(29) = 3.09, p < .005, but not when it was formatted as a relative 
frequency, p > .2.  
The signed deviations were reliably different from zero when the description 
was presented in the percentage format and the experience outcome was moderate 
and, t(29) = 4.19,  p < .001. In the three other conditions, the signed deviations were 
not reliably different from zero, p > .2. 
 
Figure 8. Signed bias in Experiment 3. Triangles – experienced outcome more extreme than 
described one. Circles – experienced outcome less extreme than described one.   
Absolute bias. Figure 9 summarizes the bias as a function of format and 
outcome assignment. The outcome assignment by presentation format interaction w s 
 49 
 
significant, F(1, 56) = 6.34, p < .05. The difference between the two formats was 
marginally significant, F(1,56) = 3.11, p = .08. The effect of the assignment was 
reliable, F(1, 56) = 4.17, p < .05. Outcome assignment yielded a reliable effect in the 
percentage format, (29) = 2.99, p < .01, but not in the frequency format, t < 1.  
 
Figure 9. Absolute bias in Experiment 3. Triangles – experienced outcome more xtreme than 
described one. Circles – experienced outcome less extreme than described one.   
 
  
Bracketing violations. The mean, median and modal number of bracket violations 
per participant was 12.0, 11.5, and 10 (out of 32), respectively. The minimum and 




Maximum likelihood parameter estimates  
The model derivation and analysis follows those of Experiment 1 and 2. The 
values of 
Dα  and Eα  (estimated from the full model) indicate that the processing of 
description and experience can be characterized as too moderate and too extreme, 
respectively (Table 6). Pearson’s correlation between 
Dα  and Eα  was -.44, p < .001. 
The confidence intervals indicate that the deviations from .5 were reliable only 
when the description was in the percentage format. Consistent with the observed 
judgments, the values of α∆  indicate that the description-experience difference 
persisted in the percentage format but was eliminated in the frequency format.  
The MANOVA with 
Dα  and Eα  as the dependent variables and the description 
format as its factor yielded a reliable effect of description format, F(2, 55) = 4.0, p < 
.05. The format affected
Dα , F(1, 56) = 7.8, p < .01, but not Eα , F(1, 56) < 1.  
 
Table 6. Description and Experience Coefficients (Experiment 3)  
   
Dα   Eα   α∆  
Format  M CI  M CI  M CI 
Percentage (n = 30)  .33  .26-.41  .59 .46-.71  .25 .08-.43 
Frequency (n = 28)  .47  .40-.54  .54 .48-.60  .07 -.04-.17 
Note. CI refers to the 95% confidence interval. Dα and Eα correspond to the 
sensitivities to description and experience, respectively. DE ααα −=∆ .  
 
The model-predicted responses were outside the [0,100] range in seven cases 
(12%). In five (9%) cases, 1=Eα . 
The residuals (ε s), averaged over participants, were biased, 63.1=θ (SEM = .40). 
This bias was reliably different from zero, t(57) = 4.06, p < .001. There were no 
 51 
 
reliable differences between the description formats, t < 1. The scatter of the residuals 
(i.e.,ς , Median = 10.4) was comparable in the two description formats (Mann 
Whitney U test, p > .7).  
 
By-subject analysis.  The procedure for conducting the model comparisons 
followed that of the first two experiments. The G2 comparisons between the full 
model and each of the restricted models are summarized in Table 5.  
 
Table 5. Results of Nested Model Comparisons (Experiment 3) 
 Format   
Hypothesis  Percentage   Frequency  
Tradeoff  .53  .46 
Equal-non-normative .50  .71 
Equal-normative .30  .43 
Note. The value in each cell corresponds to the proportion of participants for whom the 
model in the given row provides a comparable fit to the full model per the G2 test. Thus, 
higher values indicate better fitting models. 
 
In the percentage format, the tradeoff model and equal non-normative models 
accounted for approximately half of the participants. In contrast, in the frequency 
format, the equal non-normative model was favored over the tradeoff model; only the 
equal non-normative model accounted for a substantial majority of the participants. 
Finally, the equal normative model could not fit the judgments of most participants in 
either format.  The fits of the restricted models relative to the full model do not differ 
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as a function of formats (i.e., a χ2 test performed on the proportions in each row of 
Table 5 yielded p > .09).  
The comparison of the tradeoff and equal-non-normative model yielded an 
important finding. Across both formats, half of the participants had λ s that were 
positive (> .07) and the rest had values that were negative (< -.08). Examination of 
each format in isolation showed that the median values of λ  were .85 and -.47 in the 
percentage and frequency conditions, respectively. The difference was reliable, per a 
Mann-Whitney U test, p < .05.  This pattern suggests that tradeoff model was superior 
to the equal-non-normative model in the percentage format, but the reverse was true 
in the frequency format. The model flexibility check revealed that the trad off and 
equal non-normative models recovered their own data for 71% and 78% of the 
participants, respectively.   
Given the support for the equal-non-normative model, it is of interest to 
compare it to the normative-equal model. The normative-equal model is nested under 
the equal-non-normative-model permitting a G2 test with one df. The test indicates 
that the two models yield a comparable fit (i.e., the G2 test yield a non-significant 
result) for 60% of the participants in the percentage format and 50% of the 
participants in the frequency format. These two proportions are comparable per a χ2 
test (p > .4).    
 
Group analysis. The dfs involved in comparing the tradeoff, equal-non-
normative, and equal-normative models to the full model across both conditions were 
58, 58, and 116. The G2 were 474.0, 453.5 and 860.2; for all comparisons, p < .001. 
 53 
 
Thus, the full model cannot be rejected. A similar pattern was obtained when the 
percentage and frequency formats were analyzed separately.  
Pooling across the two formats, the tradeoff model was favored over the 
equal-non-normative model. Specifically, the λ obtained from comparing the tradeoff 
model to the equal-non-normative model was -10.3. However, when the formats were 
examined separately, the λs in the percentage and frequency formats were 56.5 and 
-66.8, respectively. Thus, the tradeoff model was preferred to the equal-non-
normative model in the percentage format, whereas the opposite was true in 
frequency format.   
The equal-non-normative model was superior to the equal-normative model in 
both formats. The dfs involved in the comparing the models in the percentage and 
frequency formats are 30 and 28, respectively. The G2 were 204.7 and 202.0; p < .001 
for both comparisons. 
 
 Perceived reliability of the description  
 
After completing the integration task, participants judged the assertion that 
Mr. Rick provided reliable information about the bag of chips. By design, participants 
rated whether they completely disagreed, somewhat disagreed, were neutral,
somewhat agreed, or completely agreed with the statement.  For analyses purpose, the 
participants’ ratings were coded on a scale from -2 (complete disagreement) through 
0 (neutral) to +2 (complete agreement).  
Mr. Rick was perceived as more trustworthy when he presented the sample 
outcome as a frequency rather than a percentage. The median trust rating in the 
percentage and fraction formats were 1.0 and 2.0, respectively. The difference 
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between the ratings in the two formats was reliable per a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (z 
= 1.40, p < .05). 
Across both description formats, the numbers of participants who completely 
disagreed, somewhat disagreed, were neutral, somewhat agreed, and completely 
agreed with the statement were 5, 5, 5, 20, and 23 respectively. The ratings from the 
completely disagree, somewhat disagree and neutral were combined to the not agree 
category to provide some stability for the following analyses.  
The trust ratings were related to the observed judgments. More trust in Mr. 
Rick was related to more consistency. The absolute bias scores of participants g ving 
not agree, partially agree and completely agree ratings were (M = 14.87, SEM = 1.16), 
(M = 11.13, SEM = 1.17), and (M = 7.28, SEM = .79), respectively. The difference 
among these bias scores is reliable, F(2, 55) = 11.26, p < .001.  
 The trust ratings were also related to the participants’ differential sensitivity 
to information from the two sources. The data in Figure 10 indicate that participan s 
who trusted Mr. Rick were equally sensitive to his information (description) as they 
were to their experience. Conversely, participants that expressed limited or no trust 
were much less sensitive to his information than to their experience.  
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The judgments deviated in the direction of the experience, and the absolute 
magnitude of the deviations was contingent on the outcome assignment. However, 
these effects were reliable only when the description was presented as a percentage.   
The coefficients estimated from the full model show that the description 
format affected the participants’ sensitivity to description. Furthermore, the tradeoff 
model outperformed the equal-non-normative model in the percentage format, but the 
converse pattern was true in the frequency format. The implication is that description 
and experience differ when description is presented as a percentage but not as 
frequency.    
Ratings of Mr. Rick’s trustworthiness were affected by the description format.  
Mr. Rick’s descriptions in the frequency format were perceived as more reliable than 
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the same descriptions in the percentage format. Ratings of Mr. Rick as more 
trustworthy were related to less bias (in absolute value) and to reduced sensitivity to 
the outcome assignment than ratings of him as less trustworthy. Similarly, 
participants who expressed limited or no trust in Mr. Rick were less sensitive to 
description (per the model coefficient) relative to their experience, whereas 
participants who expressed trust in Mr. Rick were equally sensitive to description and 
experience.  
The format effect on the bias, the model coefficients and comparisons, and the 
trust ratings suggests that there was an advantage to using a frequency format rather 
than description format for conveying description (for similar findings, see Cosmide  
& Tooby 1996; Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995). Processing frequencies may be more 
similar, or perhaps identical, with processing experienced information compared to 
processing percentages (c.f., Gottlieb et al., 2007). Thus, the advantage of the 
frequency format is attributed to the similarity (compatibility) of the processes that 
operate on description and on experience. Processing compatibility, in turn, might be 
tied to processing fluency; if so, participants may judge the trustworthiness of Mr. 
Rick by assessing how fluently they process information that he provides (Werth & 




Chapter 5:  General Discussion  
 
This research assessed the quality of the integration of probabilistic 
information obtained via description and experience and specified some of the 
underlying processes. The influences of the two information modes on the judgments 
were measured by estimating the coefficients of a model that mimics the subjective 
integration processes that produce the judgment.   
 
Quality of integration. Judgments were biased in the direction of the 
experienced outcome (as indicated by the signed bias). The signed bias varied as  
function of the source presentation sequence (Experiment 1), the presence (vs. 
absence) of a judgment aid (Experiment 2), and the numerical format of the 
description (Experiment 3). Judgments were also affected by the informatin 
assignment; i.e., whether they were informed by an extreme experience and moderate 
description or the opposite assignment. 
Process.  We assumed that three processes mediate the effect of description 
and experience on the observed integration behavior. The labels for these processes, 
scaling, aggregation, and response provide a convenient framework for summarizing 
and discussing the findings. The framework is a tentative statement about the 
underlying processes because as stated in the introduction, the algebra of the 
integration model does not allow isolation of the most plausible process for any give  
finding. Following the format in the introduction, we present evidence consistent with 
the response, aggregation and scaling assumptions in this order.  
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Response. Our response assumption was concerned with translating a covert 
judgment to the response scale. We used the identify function to formalize the 
assumption that the covert and overt judgments are identical to each other.  
The results of our modeling indicate that the identity function might be 
inadequate. Our model predicted responses that were outside the permissible range, 
yet those responses never occurred (were not allowed). A response transformation 
function easily can shrink the predicted judgments to fall within the legal range. 
These predictions might reflect a bias analogous to shrinking or stretching the 
response scale (c.f., Philips & Edwards, 1966).  
Another pertinent finding is the reliable bias of the predicted judgments 
relative to the observed judgments. The predictions underestimated the observed 
judgments in Experiment 1 and 3, but overestimated them in Experiment 2. An 
interpretation in terms of tendency to over- or under-estimate the percentage of red 
chips would suffice if the direction of the bias were consistent across experiments. 
The inconsistency across experiments is unclear.  
 Aggregation. The covert response receives its input from the aggregation 
mechanism. We formalized our assumption about the aggregation mechanism using a 
weighted average operation. The weights could be determined by several subjective 
differentiations between description and experience. Such dimensions include 
precision (e.g., Du & Budescu, 2005), concreteness (Hamilton & Thompson, 2007), 
the effort/fidelity involved in coding information from different formats (e.g., 
Johnson, Payne, & Bettman, 1988), and credibility (Yaniv, & Kleinberger, 2000). 
Building on the differences along dimensions, the integration process allots more 
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weight to the source associated with higher values on these dimensions and less 
weight to the source associated with lower values.  
The notion of a tradeoff between the weights allotted to information from the 
two sources was supported in two ways. One was the finding of the inverse 
association between the two coefficients of the full model. More direct support was 
the finding that the preferred model (for most participants) in Experiment 1 and the 
percentage condition of Experiment 3 was a model that requires a tradeoff between 
the processes that operate on the two sources.  
Intuitively, the weight allotted to information from a particular source should 
range from 0 to 1. The bracket violations we observed suggest that this intuition 
might be incorrect. They could also lead to the impossible model predictions we 
observed. These possibilities suggest that it might be unnecessary to revise our 
response assumption (i.e., the identity function).  
Scaling. We assumed that the inputs to the aggregation mechanism are 
subjective representations of description- and experience- based information. 
Crucially, the full model allows the characteristics (i.e., parameterization) of the 
scaling transformation to be contingent on whether the information is obtained via 
description or experience.   
Two of the restricted models, the equal-normative and equal-non-normative, 
require identical scaling of description and experience. The equal-normative model
was treated above, in conjunction with the response assumption. Here the focus is on 
the equal-non-normative model.  
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The equal-non-normative model did not fit the data, with one important 
exception. The finding of a poor fit is consistent with the hypothesis that information 
from the two sources is not scaled in a similar way (Gottlieb et al., 2007; Hau et al., 
2008). The exception was the model fit given the relative frequency format in 
Experiment 3. This pattern of differential support for the equal-non-normative model 
is related to the claim that experience is more similar to descriptions formatted as 
relative frequencies than to descriptions formatted as percentages (Girenzer & 
Hoffrage, 1995).  
The model estimates showed that the presentation sequence (Experiment 1), 
the experience aid (Experiment 2), and the description format (Experiment 3) affected 
processes related to only one source. These patterns appear to be more consistent with 
the scaling assumption compared to the weighting and response assumptions.    
Information assignment (e.g., experience outcome more extreme than 
described one) yielded a reliable influence on the judgments in Experiment 2 and in 
the percentage format of Experiment 3. As we have shown in the introduction, and 
assuming the validity of our model, the assignment effects is expected when the 
sources differ in scaling and the tradeoff between them is imperfect.   
The information assignment did not yield a reliable effect in Experiment 1 and 
in the frequency format of Experiment 3. The interpretation of the null effect in 
Experiment 1 is unclear. Conversely, and as mentioned above, the null effect in the 
frequency condition of Experiment 3 is consistent with the claim that experienc and 
descriptions presented as relative frequencies are psychologically simi ar to each 




Broader contribution  
  
This research examined the subjective integration of two units of information that 
differed from each other in their source and presentation format. The processes 
involved in integrating information that differs in format might be similar to those 
involved when processing information in different units of measurements (e.g., 
centimeters vs. inches or monetary currencies). The reliance on information from 
different sources is at the core of using advice (e.g., Budescu & Yu, 2006, Yaniv & 
Kleinberger, 2000). 
The results of Experiment 3 are consistent with the hypothesis that the qualityof 
human judgment depends on the format compatibility of the inputs to the judgment 
(for similar results, see Cosmides & Tooby, 1996). If generalizable, these results raise 
concerns about the quality of people’s processing of incompatible formats in 
consequential tasks performed outside the lab. 
We suggest that the current methodology can be adapted to improve our 
understanding of subjective processing of information obtained in potentially 
incompatible formats. For example, future research might identify characteristi s of 
the integration task that moderate the effect of incompatible formats on the quality of 
judgment (e.g., instructions, prompts, presentation sequence, and incentives).  
People might differ from each other in their ability to process information in 
incompatible formats. The current methodology could be expanded to test whether 
the quality of the judgments is related to individual differences in dimensions such a  
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numeracy (i.e., Peters, Västfјäll, Slovic, Metrz, Mazzocco, & Dickert, 2006), and 
tendency to engage in effortful cognitive activities (i.e., need for cognition, Cacioppo 
& Petty, 1982).  
Human decision makers might perceive information from internal and external 
sources as differentially reliable.  The effect of these perceptions on the quality of the 
judgments could interact with the format compatibility effects. Thus, the curr nt 
methodology could be adapted to investigate the interplay between the perceived 







Let TR̂  and 'ˆTR  represent the model predictions given distributions A and B.  
Formally,  
)(1[50ˆ 21 EDEDT PPR αααα +−++=  , and, 
)](1[50ˆ 12' EDEDT PPR αααα +−++= . 
Let 
*ˆ RRii −=δ correspond to the deviation between the predicted and the 
normative judgment, where i = T, T′ refers to the information distribution. The 
hypothesis that the judgments are unaffected by the information distribution implies 
that |||| 'TT δδ = . This condition implies that either I)
*
'
* ˆˆ RRRR TT −=−  or 
II) '
** ˆˆ
TT RRRR −=− .  
We can rewrite case (I) as follows, 'ˆˆ TT RR = . Further algebraic development 
shows that 'TT δδ =  if 0))(( 21 =−− EDPP αα . In other words, given two different 
stimuli (i.e., 21 PP ≠ ), the judgments will be unaffected by information distribution 
if ED αα = . The subjective processing of description and experience is similar, and 
information distribution has no effect on the judgment.   
We rearrange case II as *' 2ˆˆ RRR TT =+ . Algebra leads 
to 0)100)(1( 21 =−+−+ PPED αα . Thus, setting 10021 ≠+ PP , the model predictions 
will be equally distant from the prescribed response if 1=+ ED αα . Psychologically, 
the outcome assignment has a symmetric effect on the judgments only if there is a 






Stimuli in Experiment 1    
 
   Sample % of Red Chips  
Bag type Bag  Sample n Sample 1 Sample 2 Prescribeda 
      
Experimental trials 
      
Identicalb    1 7 14 14 14 
 2 7 43 43 43 
 3 7 57 57 57 
 4 7 86 86 86 
 5 9 11 11 11 
 6 9 89 89 89 
 7 11 9 9 9 
 8 11 91 91 91 
 9 13 8 8 8 
 10 13 92 92 92 
Differentc 11 7 14 57 36 
 12 7 86 43 65 
 13 9 22 33 28 
 14 9 78 67 73 
 15 9 33 56 45 
 16 9 67 44 56 
 17 11 18 36 27 
 18 11 82 64 73 
 19 11 27 64 46 
 20 11 73 36 55 
 21 13 15 46 31 
 22 13 85 54 70 
 23 13 31 62 47 
 24 13 69 38 54 
      
Practice trials 
      
Differentc P1 6 17 33 25 
 P2 6 83 50 67 
 P3 14 21 64 43 
 P4 14 79 43 61 
a Prescribed estimate of red chips in the bag (%). b Identical-percentage bags. c 








Stimuli in Experiments 2 and 3 
   
 Sample % of Red Chips  
Bag Sample 1 Sample 2 Prescribed estimate (%) 
    
Experimental trials 
    
1 0 23 12 
2 100 77 88 
3 8 15 12 
4 92 85 88 
5 0 38 19 
6 100 62 81 
7 8 31 19 
8 92 69 81 
9 15 38 27 
10 85 62 73 
11 8 46 27 
12 92 54 73 
13 23 46 35 
14 77 54 65 
15 31 38 35 
16 69 62 65 
    
Practice trials 
    
P1 0 8 4 
P2 100 92 96 
P3 23 15 19 
P4 77 85 81 
P5 23 31 27 
P6 77 69 73 
P7 38 46 42 
P8 62 54 58 
Note. Only different-percentage bags were used in these experiments. For all of the 
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